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INCOME INEQUALITY: PANEL ON
FINANCIALIZATION, ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITY,
AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
BY TIMOTHY NOAH
Author Timothy Noah argues that income inequality is
increasing in the United States. Noah explores the causes of this trend
and examines how income distribution has changed throughout the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. He then compares income
inequality in the United States with income distribution in comparable
industrialized democracies. Finally, Noah considers income
inequality's potential effects on the national economy.
I should start by saying I am not an academic, I am not a lawyer,
I am not a sociologist of any kind; I am a journalist. My book, The
Great Divergence: America's Growing Inequality Crisis and What We
Can Do About It, is an attempt to bridge the gap between the general
public and the very good work that academics have done on the
question of why income inequality has been increasing over the last
thirty-three years. There are two types of income inequality that have
occurred since 1979. One trend is a growing divergence between skilled
labor and unskilled labor, or moderately skilled labor. This is sometimes
called "broad-based inequality" or "quintile-based inequality." The
other, simultaneous, trend is famously known as the one percent versus
the ninety-nine percent, which is to say the affluent and the rich versus
everybody else. By both measures inequality shrank for much of the
twentieth century, from the early 1930s to the late 1970s. This rebuts
any notion that income inequality or growing income inequality is
somehow inherent to capitalism. Inequality began growing, for the first
time in nearly half a century, in the late 1970s.
These two types of income inequality are not necessarily linked.
Broad-based inequality has multiple causes. I am not going to discuss
1. TIMOTHY NOAH, THE GREAT DIVERGENCE: AMERICA'S GROWING INEQUALITY
CRISIS AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT (2012).
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that much because I don't think it has much to do with the
financialization of the United States economy, the theme of this panel.2
The one-percent-versus-the-ninety-nine-percent type of inequality is
linked to financialization and that will be my focus.
There is one significant way in which these two trends are
linked and that is in the shrinkage of wages as a portion of GDP, which
is now at a fifty-year low. There are lots of different ways to measure
this, but the most credible studies suggest that we are seeing a shift in
allocation of GDP from labor to capital. There are some pretty obvious
reasons why that should occur that I will discuss later.
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2. Donald Tomaskovic-Devey & Ken-Hou Lin, Financialization: Causes, Inequality
Consquences, and Policy Implications, 18 N.C. Banking Inst. 167 (2013).
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We see that over the last 100 years or so the income share for
the top one percent shrank until the late 1970s, and then expanded. As
of 2008, we had eighteen percent income share for the top one percent,
which is twice what it was in the late 1970s. Note also the period from
the 1930's through 1970's, which is known as the "Great Compression"
(a term that Harvard University economist Claudia Goldin has applied
to this period because incomes were compressing). That compression
occurred during the Depression and World War II, which is perhaps not
that surprising. But it continued during the post-war boom, which is
surprising. Starting around 1979 we see that the top one percent started
to regain income share, and that its share expanded and expanded.
There is a whole school of thought that says we should not think
of the post-war U.S. economy as representative of anything because
Europe was in rubble. That is not a very good argument because Europe
did not stay in rubble for very long. We had the Marshall plan and we
had the West German economic miracle, which really was miraculous,
as Chart 1 demonstrates. By the 1960s, the West German GDP per
capita was more than seventy percent of U.S. GDP per capita. 3
Recessions are bad for rich people, and during the Great
Recession of 2007-2009 we heard some people argue, "Why are we
giving so much time and attention to income inequality? The problem is
obviously solved because income share for the top one percent is going
down." It's true that income share for the top one percent did go down
from 2007 to 2009, and it went down more rapidly for the one percent
than it did for everyone else. But please note that this sudden trend
toward greater income equality did not outlast the recession. During the
first two years of the current economic recovery, 2009 to 2011, the top
one percent rebounded and the bottom ninety-nine percent did not. A
shocking statistic you may have heard is that through 2010 the top one
percent captured ninety-three percent of the economic recovery.4 If yOU
extend that timeline through 2011 you find that the top one percent
captured 121 percent of the recovery, which is to say that the top one
3. Paul Krugman, The Europe-in-Rubble Excuse, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL,
N.Y. TIMES Blog (November 19, 2012, 8:56 AM),
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/19/the-europe-in-rubble-excuse/?_r-1.
4. Emmanuel Saez and Thomas Piketty just updated their findings and now they
include 2012 preliminary estimates. See Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution
of Top Incomes in the United States (September 3, 2013), available at
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/-saez/saez-UStopincomes-2012.pdf.
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percent recovered while the bottom ninety-nine percent of the
population saw its income share shrink, which is really remarkable. So,
clearly we have in effect two different economies for these two different
groups.
The period since 2000 has, in the United States, been bad for
both kinds of inequality-the broad-based kind and the one-percent
kind. The Gini index, which is the main measure of broad-based
inequality, 5 has increased every year except for 2002 and 2007. In
2011, which is the most recent year for which we have data, the increase
was the biggest single-year rise that we had seen in two decades.
Median income is down almost nine percent since 2000. Some will
quibble that the calculation is based on pre-tax, pre-benefit dollars, and
that when you figure in government redistribution through taxes and
benefits things don't look as bad. But in fact, if you throw in taxes and
benefits, median income has basically been flat during this period,
which is certainly nothing to write home about.
In general, broad-based inequality grew in the 1980s, eased in
the late 1990s during the tech boom, and started growing again in the
2000s. You often hear people congratulate Bill Clinton for presiding
over the only period since 1979 when we saw a reduction in income
inequality, and he does deserve some credit for that. But if he gets a pat
on the back for that he should also get some blame for a stupendous rise
in the one percent's income share during that same period. Remember,
when you are talking about the growth in income inequality, you are
talking about two distinct trends, and they do not always track each
other.
Income inequality is without a doubt a global phenomenon, but
it is worse in the United States than it is in comparable nations. That is
especially true by the measure of the one percent versus the ninety-nine
percent, which puts us dead last (or first, depending on how you look at
it). Even though income inequality is a global trend, I think it is
important to point out that it is not a universal trend. There are a number
of reasonably advanced industrial democracies around the world where
incomes have grown more equal. That has been especially true in Latin
America, which for many years was the international poster child for
income inequality. Today, Latin America is moving in the right
5. Gini doesn't really do a very good job of measuring the 1 percent versus the 99
percent.
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direction even as we are moving in the wrong direction. Other countries
where we are seeing growing income equality are Turkey, Greece
(which I suppose is not a great example of anything right now), Chile,
and Italy. In my book I include France in that list because the data at
the time I wrote my book showed that France had also seen an increase
in income equality. But a more recent study shows that inequality has
lately increased a bit, so now the best one can say is that there is really
no significant long-term net change for France. That is also true in
Hungary and Belgium. Income inequality is not something that is
destined to happen everywhere.
One argument people make about income inequality is that we
do not really need to worry about it because we have so much
intergenerational income mobility in the United States. My answer is
that even if that were true, we would still have to worry about those left
behind. But in fact it is not true. We do not have very good
intergenerational mobility compared to other nations. 6 This has really
changed in the United States, and I think people have started to
recognize that. It became an issue in the 2012 primary race. Rick
Santorum talked it up a lot. Santorum tried to blame it on Barack
Obama, but that isn't fair, because America's slowdown in
intergenerational mobility long precedes his presidency.
Alan Krueger, who until recently was chairman of the White
House Council of Economic Advisers charted something he called the
Great Gatsby curve drawing on research from a Canadian economist
named Miles Corak.7 The chart suggests that the more income
inequality you have, the less mobility you're going to have. Another
way of putting it is that the more income inequality you have, the more
"heritable" income becomes, meaning you increase the likelihood that
people will end up occupying the same position in the income
distribution that their parents occupied. This is not definitive. The work
on this is somewhat tentative, but it certainly is logical to suspect that
income inequality would inhibit mobility because, as Isabel Sawhill of
6. See Jason Long & Joseph Ferrie, A Tale of Two Labor Markets: Intergenerational
Occupational Mobility in Britain and the U.S. Since 1850, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 1109
(2013).
7. See Miles Corak, How to Slide Down the 'Great Gatsby Curve,' Inequality, Life
Chances, and Public Policy in the United States, CTR. FOR AM. PROG. (Dec. 2012),
available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/CorakMiddleClass.pdf.
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the Brookings Institution has said,8 and President Obama has repeated,
"as the rungs of the ladder grow farther apart, the ladder gets harder to
climb." 9
Part of this story is the death of labor unions. That narrative is
mostly a subplot of the broad-based inequality story, but it also figures
in the rise of the one percent at the expense of the ninety-nine percent,
because the portion of GDP dedicated to labor has, over time, shrunk
relative to the portion dedicated to capital. An obvious explanation why
is that union density within the private sector has been shrinking since
the 1950s. It peaked in 1954 at about forty percent. Today it is at seven
percent, which is the same level it stood at in 1933. A sentence I wrote
in my book that I could have written at several points, particularly with
respect to financial regulation, is, "It's as if the New Deal never
happened."10 That's certainly true with respect to the condition of
unions today. This is the part of my book that is hardest for audiences to
get interested in. What I say is: Look, if you're not interested in trying
to figure out a way to save labor, then you should not be interested in
income inequality. Take up chess or something, because you are not
going to fix income inequality unless you can reverse labor's decline.
The other trend we have seen in recent years is the growing
power of capital, which is what this panel is about. The two drivers of
income growth for the top one percent have been the seemingly
uncontrollable rise in compensation for high-ranking nonfinancial
corporate executives and the growth of the deregulated financial sector.
Executive compensation soared out of control due to stock-option
compensation that is often unrelated to company performance. Not to
beat up too much on Bill Clinton, but he has to take it on the chin for
this too because he, with the best of intentions, limited the deductibility
of CEO pay at a ceiling of one million dollars. Nell Minow, a corporate
watchdog, told me that two things happened as a result. First, every
CEO got a raise to one million dollars. Second, everyone started getting
paid more and more in stock options, which for a long time were off the
8. See Isabel Sawhill, CENTER ON CHILDREN AND FAMILIES AT BROOKINGS, CCF
BRIEF #48: ARE WE HEADED TOWARD A PERMANENTLY DIVIDED SOCIETY? (Mar. 2012),
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/papers/2012/3/30%20divided%20society
%20sawhill/0330_divided society-sawhill.
9. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Economy at Knox
College, Galesburg, Illinois (July 24, 2013).
10. NOAH,supra note 1.
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books, because corporations took the preposterous position that since
they didn't know what the options were going to be worth when
exercised, they couldn't value them at all. Since stock options were not
on the books, they could be granted with impunity, and that is when
things really went out of control.' 1
The other driver of income growth, the explosive growth of the
deregulated financial sector, is what this conference is all about. A very
good 2011 study looked at the question, "Who are the 0.1 percent?"
Table 3 -Percentage of primary taxpayers in top 0.1 percent of the distribution of income (excluding capital gains) that are in each occupation
1979 1993 1997 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Executives. managers, supervisors (nri-nance) 4&1 45.7 484 471 426 406 40.5 40.9 42.5
Financial prfessronincludingmanagemaient 11,0 14.1 147 164 191 190 17.8 18-7 18.0
Lawyers 7-3 6.5 6.3 59 71 8.2 8.8 8.0 7.3
Medical 79 13.3 6.8 4.4 52 6.8 7.6 6-3 5.9
Not oring or deceased 54 2.5 3.5 3.8 4.0 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.8
Real estate 1.8 1.3 1.8 2.1 2.5 2.9 3.0 3.3 37
Entrepreneur Anot elsewhere classied 3.9 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.2 3.0 3.0
Ats, nedia, sports 22 3.3 3.5 15 3.3 36 3.4 3.3 3.0
Business operations (nonfilance) 1.5 1.7 2.3 22 2.7 27 2-2 2.7 2.9
Computer, math, englneering, technical (noninance) 23 2.3 3.1 4.7 4.0 3.0 31 3.0 2 9
Other known occupation 2-9 2.1 2.2 2.6 2.5 25 24 2.5 27
Skded sa!es (except finance or real estate) 22 2,9 2.9 26 2.4 23 2.3 2.3 2.3
Professors and scientists 0-8 08 0.7 08 0.9 09 0.9 0.9 0.9
Farnners & ranchers 14 02 0.5 05 0.5 05 0.5 0.5 0.6
Unknom 14 05 0.5 09 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.5
More than the one percent, it is really the 0.1 percent who are
driving the increase in income share for people at the top. The majority
of the 0.1 percent turned out to be either executives in the non-financial
sector or financial professionals. If you go back to 1979 you see that
forty-eight percent of this 0.1 percent were executives of nonfinancial
companies. It's essentially the same today; nonfinancial executives'
representation within the top 0.1 percent slipped only a little bit down to
42.5% as of 2005. The really striking change has occurred within the
second biggest group, which is people working in the financial sector.
They represented eleven percent of the top 0.1 percent back in 1979.
Today they represent eighteen percent. While executives in nonfinancial
companies have maintained their strong presence within this super-elite
club, financial professionals have greatly increased their presence. The
rest of the 0.1 percent includes lawyers, doctors, and people in real
11. See Frank Partnoy, INFECTIOUS GREED: How DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE
FINANCIAL MARKETS 213-16 (2003); see also Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive
Compensation: Managerial Power Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI.
L. REv. 847 (2002).
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estate. You hear a lot about the winner-take-all syndrome-the
dramatic, technology-driven scaling up of the potential customer base
for certain people occupying the very top of their professions-a
phenomenon that mostly applies to the worlds of entertainment and
sports. But the entertainment and sports professions are not a major
contributor to income inequality. Yes, there are individuals who reap
huge financial gains from their dominance in entertainment and sports,
but there just are not that many of them. Arts, media, and sports
represent only two percent of the 0.1 percent. The people you really
want to keep your eye on are the financial professionals.
